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1. Introduction
   Infrastructure requirements have long played an important role in the development
debate. Until recently these requirements referred to the need for improvements in roads,
railways, electricity supply, telecommunications and the like. Lack of such infrastructure
was seen as an important cause of a country’s relative poverty. Investments in physical
infrastructure seem not to have had the desired growth effects in developing countries,
however.
         The search for the root cause of economic development has led the mainstream of
economists to the system of rules for economic activity. The attention to rules and
institutions became wide-spread only after the fall of communism, although Nobel
prizes had been awarded to Friedrich Hayek and Gunnar Myrdahl in 1974, and Ronald
Coase in 1983 for their contributions to institutional and political economics. These
prices represented a recognition that institutional and political economics help explain
important aspects of the organization of economic activity, but few economists took the
additional step to analyze institutional factors as root causes of development and growth.
An exception was Douglas North, who received the Nobel prize in 1993 after the fall
communism and a renewed interest in institutional economics. This interest was to a
large extent sparked by the formerly centrally planned economies’ failure to start
growing.  Economic research began to focus on social institutions in general, and the
legal system in particular, defining and securing property rights, enabling trade, and
providing incentives for economic activity.
           Among social institutions the legal system is most directly subject to change, at
least with respect to the letter of the law. Thus it is natural that policy-oriented
economists would emphasize legal reform to enhance incentives leading to economic
growth.
            Economic growth requires that old activities are phased out to make room for
new ones, and that economic resources are reallocated from activities that are no longer
profitable. This reallocation can occur within a variety of organizational structures, but
the failure of projects and firms must be seen as an inherent aspect of growth process.3
       The Asian crisis and a large number of more or less severe banking crises
1 in a
variety of countries during the last decades have led to questions about the ability of
economic systems to deal with wide-spread failure of firms. Caprio and Klingebiel
(1996) refer to the lack of procedures for banks to settle and recover claims on distressed
firms as a cause of lingering and recurring banking crisis in many countries. Krugman
(1994) noted before the crisis that investments kept flowing to projects of questionable
value in many Asian countries. A mechanism for abandonment of non-profitable
projects seemed to be missing. In the Eastern European transition economies state-
owned enterprises or formerly state-owned large enterprises producing negative value
could not be closed down in an orderly fashion. Laws, procedures, and court capacity
was missing. Bankruptcy law was implemented in several of countries with mixed
results as will be discussed below.
         While there may have been too few bankruptcies in Asia and Eastern Europe the
argument in the Swedish policy debate after the banking crisis in the early 90s was that
there were too many bankruptcies of viable firms, and that the recession therefore
became unnecessarily deep.
        These experiences indicate that the procedures for dealing with insolvent firms may
affect economic growth, and the depth and duration of crises. These procedures, and the
institutions and organizations involved are viewed as the “infrastructure for bankruptcy”
in this paper. At the center of the discussion stands insolvency law for firms and the
court systems supporting the law, but the bankruptcy infrastructure could be considered
to be much broader including or relating to a broad array of formal law and informal
procedures. Informal procedures for insolvency are as important as the law and they
necessarily involve banks as the major creditors. Therefore, law and regulation for
financial institutions may be considered an aspect of the infrastructure for bankruptcy.
From banks’ point of view insolvency procedure is only one aspect of debt recovery.
The procedures for debt recovery include security enforcement, which depend on
property rights registration and enforcement. Other stakeholders than banks are also
affected by a firm’s insolvency. Employees, customers, suppliers, the state, and of
                                               
1  Caprio Jr. and Klingebeil (1996) record 93 banking crisis of systemic magnitude between 1980 and
1995.4
course shareholders may have a stake and some kind of claim on a firm’s assets.
Insolvency essentially means that formal and informal contractual relations with some or
all of the firm’s stakeholders must be breached. Thus the variety of laws regulating
contractual relations among stakeholders interact with insolvency procedures.
      Although bankruptcy is not a criminal offense, and debtors’ prisons have been
abandoned in most countries, criminal law relating to civil fraud and corruption has a
bearing on insolvency procedures. Finally, personal bankruptcy procedures may affect
insolvency procedures for firms even under limited liability, because a firm’s owners’
personal guarantees may be required by creditors.
      We will not cover all these aspects of the “bankruptcy-related” infrastructure but we
focus, as noted on formal and informal insolvency procedures. Insolvency law will be
used as a term covering both bankruptcy law and explicit law for restructuring of firms
without change of ownership. Thus, bankruptcy always implies that a firm as a whole, or
its assets, are offered for sale to new owners.
2
       While lawyers often focus on fairness and equity in their discussion of insolvency
law, economists are concerned with economic efficiency, growth, and business cycle
fluctuations. Wood (1995) notes that there are wide differences in insolvency law among
countries based on differences in legal doctrines, but there is no obvious relation
between legal doctrine and economic growth or economic wealth.
       Insolvencies happen everywhere but practices vary with respect to law, informal
procedures, effectiveness, and predictability of procedures. Lack of bankruptcies does
not necessarily mean lack of insolvency procedures. Informal work-outs are common,
and informal procedures are well established in many countries. On the other hand, the
existence of insolvency law does not necessarily imply that it has much influence on
procedures, and in some countries procedures are neither well established nor
predictable. Legal traditions and cultural factors affect the attitude to bankruptcy, and
procedures for dealing with insolvency. Political factors affecting objectives of formal
law and informal procedures vary, as well, across countries and time. Political
influences on the banking system, and concentrated ownership of corporations forming
                                               
2 This terminology is common but not general. Sometimes bankruptcy law is used as a term for insolvency
law including restructuring law.5
strong vested interests can affect the allocation of credit and state subsidies in such a
way that insolvency procedures are seriously undermined. We return to these issues.
       The paper proceeds in Section 2 with a discussion of the economic role of
insolvency procedures for efficiency of resource allocation, economic growth, and the
depth and duration of crises. Efficiency of procedures are discussed further in Section 3
where  a distinction is made between ex ante (at the time financial commitments are
made) and ex post (at the time of insolvency) efficiency. The purpose of Section 4 is to
classify procedures in an economically meaningful way. It is common to distinguish
between creditor-and debtor oriented procedures. More interesting from an economic
viewpoint is whether procedures tend to lead to “excessive survival” or “excessive shut-
downs” of firms. These distinctions do not necessarily coincide.
      In Section 5, we look at the wide differences in restructuring laws across countries.
Stylized facts about the performance of laws in different countries in terms restructuring
vs shut-down, and survival vs shutdown are presented in Section 6.. Stylized facts from
developing countries point to the important issue of enforcement of law. Two aspects of
enforcement are discussed in Section 6. First, the legal system may be ineffective in its
application of existing law. Second, political influences on the banking system in
particular may render insolvency procedures irrelevant.
      The strongest policy implications refer to enforcement. This and other aspects of
design of formal insolvency procedures and their associated infrastructure are discussed
in Section 8. The basic question whether or why insolvency law is needed at all is also
asked.
2. The Role of Insolvency law and Procedures
“Bankruptcy is a collective procedure for the recovery of debts by creditors.  It also
protects individuals who have become overburdened by their debts.” (Wood, 1995
Preface)
          This quote summarizes well the role of bankruptcy law including separate laws for
restructuring such as Chapter 11 in the U.S.A.  There is a potential benefit to both
creditors and debtors in bankruptcy.  Creditors wish to recover debts to the extent
possible in a speedy manner from a borrower who is unable to pay all creditors fully.6
From the borrower’s point of view, bankruptcy should allow the speedy resolution of
debts.  Thereafter, the borrower can devote his or her human and other remaining
resources to new ventures.  The assets employed in the firm can similarly be reallocated
to projects with positive values.
     Insolvency procedures, including informal, voluntarily agreed upon
procedures for settling the debts of an insolvent borrower, play an important role in the
restructuring process of an economy.  Without agreed upon procedures in contracts or in
law specifying, for example, priority among creditors, conflicts of interest between the
debtor and creditors, and among creditors could hinder any resolution of claims.
Expecting such a situation, debtors could try to recover loans as soon as they suspect a
borrower to be heading for distress.  Thus, positive value projects may be prematurely
abandoned, if one or more creditors would be able to recover a loan.  An important
efficiency aspect of insolvency procedures is, accordingly, that they provide a timely
resolution of claims as emphasized by Posner (1992)
In the following subsection the role of insolvency procedures for firms in
“economic and financial distress” is discussed.
Economic and financial distress
         In Table 1, a distinction is made between “economic distress” and “financial
distress.”  In “economic distress” the net present value of the firm’s assets are negative
and from a financial valuation point of view, the firm should be shut down in its present
form.  It is  possible, however, that physical assets under different management would
produce a positive net present value.  In this case, it would be efficient to auction or sell
the firm as a “going concern” to new owners that would be able to improve
management. Under “financial distress,” the  present value of  the expected cash flows
generated by the assets is positive but the firm’s debts exceed the present value of these
cash flows. Thus, the firm is insolvent but its assets produce a positive value from a
social point of view.  In this case, debt-reduction and restructuring, possibly in
combination with more fundamental restructuring, such as change in control, would be
efficient.
A firm may find itself in financial distress also because of liquidity constraints
even if the present value of cash flows from assets exceeds the debts. This situation7
presumes that the financial system for one reason or another fails in its role of providing
liquidity to solvent firms. The obvious remedy is rescheduling of debt, or liquidity
infusion.
The difficulty of designing optimal insolvency procedures is to a large extent
caused by information problems and asymmetries of information about the cause of
distress.  The procedures must be determined ex ante before distress occurs for lenders
to be able to evaluate credit risk, and in order to reduce the risk of conflicts of interest.
At the time of distress, shareholders and debtors may want to claim different reasons for
distress  without either party being able to clearly prove its claim. Only for firms with an
extremely simple structure of stakeholders would it be possible to resolve conflicts in an
efficient manner at the time of distress.  Thus, without ex ante insolvency procedures
firms will tend to remain simple in their stakeholder structure or be organized with the
objective of reducing the probability of bankruptcy in, for example, conglomerates.
         Insolvency procedures, should not only resolve a distress situation but the
resolution should be  accomplished at the lowest possible costs. Altman and Vanderhoof
(1994) studied direct and indirect bankruptcy costs in the USA and found them
substantial in many industries.
3 Thus bankruptcy costs can be an important determinant
of a firm’s financial structure.
Table 1, Types of distress
Insolvency procedures in growth and crisis
        Insolvency procedures provide only one way to restructure an economy where
assets need to be reallocated continuously in response to changes in preferences,
technology and human skill. Mergers and acquisitions, internal restructuring within
conglomerates, and voluntary closings of firms with associated asset sales offer
alternatives in the restructuring process. Thus, insolvency procedures should be seen in
the larger context of their contribution to restructuring
                                               
3 Direct bankruptcy costs are, for example, lawyers’ fees, while indirect costs may be caused by lost sales,
or added costs of inputs in a distress-situation. Expected costs of this kind can exceed 10 percent of a
firm’s value well in advance of distress. Weiss (1997) obtain lower estimates of bankruptcy costs.8
Insolvency procedures or the lack thereof can be the cause of recessions and economic
crisis, they can deepen a crisis, and they may extend or shorten the duration of a crisis
by influencing the speed of recovery.
      Insolvency procedures can be the cause of a crisis if economically distressed firms
do not shutdown, but accumulate over time until the banking system and the government
no longer find the costs of support bearable.  Disincentives for bankruptcy in
combination with a politically influenced banking system, and state support of banks
and firms contributed to the depth of crisis in some Asian economies according to
several observers (see e.g. Pomerleano, 1999, and Hussain and Wihlborg, 1999).
      The former socialist economies had and some still have these characteristics. The
disincentives for bankruptcy may be hat proceedings are costly, and long drawn out with
little likelihood for creditors to be paid in any case.
         An existing crisis may be deepened and prolonged if financially distressed firms
are not rehabilitated but are forced to shut down. Similarly, a crisis is deepened, if
liquidity problems cause the shut-down of operations in a credit crunch. Wide-spread
financial distress may be caused by a severe macro-economic shock, large exchange rate
changes, or increases in interest rates. We certainly observed this type on deepening of a
crisis in the hard hit Asian economies, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand
(Hussain and Wihlborg, 1999)
         There is also strong evidence that the lack of effective insolvency procedures
contribute to banking-crisis, and the ability of banks to recover from crisis. Caprio Jr and
Klingebiel (1996) study severe banking crises in 69 countries between 1980 and 1995.
Crises in 26 countries are studied in more detail with respect to their causes, and the
resolution of crises. In a large share of the latter countries politically influenced lending
practicies of banks were seen as a contributing cause of the crisis. An inefficient legal
framework hindered the resolution of crises in many countries.
4
                                               
4 Debt recovery was hampered by the legal system in the following heterogeneous group of countries with
recent banking crises: Benin, the Ivory Coast, Guinea, Madagascar, Senegal, Indonesia, Thailand, Brazil,
and Hungary.  These observations indicate that a large number of countries with different legal traditions
on all continents have insolvency procedures that contribute to or prolong economic crises.9
3. Ex post versus ex ante efficiency and specific assets
       It is easy to lay down the principle that if a firm’s assets generate a positive net
present value, then they should continue in operation even if the firm is in distress. The
difficulty of implementing procedures leading to “ex post efficiency” as defined above is
substantial, because of differences in availability of information among managers,
shareholders and various creditors, and because inherent conflicts of interest imply that
all information is not voluntarily disclosed. As a result, an independent body with
enforcement powers, such as a court, is required in order to come to a conclusion on the
issues of restructuring vs. liquidation, and of control.   The valuation of assets at the time
of distress is extremely difficult to arrive at, however. To obtain any approximation of
value it may be necessary to offer the assets for sale in different configurations.
Offering the assets for sale as a “going concern” or piecemeal implies that the alternative
of rehabilitation including debt forgiveness with the present ownership is made more
difficult.  Only if the present owner can make the highest bid in spite of distress will
there be restructuring without change of control. (Such informal restructurings are not
uncommon as we note in Section 6)
     One reason why the present owner may value the firm higher than others is
that he or she may have “invested” in or acquired firm-specific human capital
(knowledge).  Since this specific capital would be lost if the present owner would not be
able to remain the owner after distress, he or she may value the firm as a going concern
higher than others.
     Not only the owner of the distressed firm may have invested in or
acquired specific capital that would be lost if a firm were discontinued as a going
concern.  First, many employees may have skills that would not provide any return if
they want to work for other firms. Second, suppliers, customers, the surrounding
community, the municipality and the state may have strong interests in the continuation
of the particular activity of the distressed firm.  These entities are then also owners of
specific assets and they have a strong interest in the firm’s survival, and actually a
willingness to pay for its survival. If there were well-functioning markets for labor and
the services provided by assets, then labor and the owners of the specific assets could
reduce their charges for the distressed firm’s use of their services.  They would thereby10
contribute to the survival of productive activities in an efficient manner. However,
markets are lacking for many assets or the services they provide, and employees are
often not able or willing to reduce their wage demands.
      These considerations lead to the argument that there could be a social good in having
a distressed firm continue under the old ownership without risking that the firm could be
shut down if it is declared bankrupt and liquidated. Employment considerations in
particular have led many countries to favor rehabilitation over bankruptcy.  Wood
(1995) observes that legislation favoring rehabilitation has generally been implemented
after severe economic downturns, when the consequences of bankruptcies have been
felt.  After WWII employment and  “job security” considerations have been a more
explicit policy concern.  As a result, a number of countries have legislated in favor of
rehabilitation and restructuring of distressed firms to discourage bankruptcies during the
last few decades. We return to specific examples of restructuring law below.
     Insolvency procedures affect economic incentives not only at the time of
distress but also at the time various stakeholders enter contracts with the still healthy
firm.  The expected resolution of distress will therefore affect the incentives of various
stakeholders to invest in firm-specific assets.  Furthermore, the procedures will effect the
willingness of different groups of creditors to supply financing. Insolvency procedures
that increase the likelihood of firm survival increase the incentives of various
stakeholders to invest in firm-specific capital.  The same procedures would reduce the
expected return on financing the firm if survival is accomplished at the expense of the
lenders.  The costs of financing the healthy firm would increase as a result.  Uncertainty
about procedures increases these costs further.
An economic efficiency analysis of these considerations is sensitive to, for
example, assumptions about the relation between asset specificity and return on projects,
the substitutability between general and specific assets, and the supply of debt financing.
Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), and Bebchuk and Picker (1993) ask how risky project
choice requiring investment in specific skills is affected by the relative position of
creditors and shareholders/managers in bankruptcy. They find that allowing
managers/shareholders to retain a stake in the assets in case of bankruptcy (deviation
from absolute priority) may enhance ex ante efficiency under limited liability.11
Frierman and Viswanath (1995) show that deviations from absolute priority
can reduce the agency problem between shareholders and lenders. Accordingly, there
will be less excess risk-taking. Gangopadhyay and Wihlborg (2000) on the other hand
come to the conclusion that favoring of shareholders/managers with specific assets may
lead to over-investment in specific and risky assets and increased credit rationing.
Thereby, the cost of capital is increased. None of these papers assign a role to
monitoring of debtors with limited liability. Cornelli and Felli (1996) link the incentives
to monitor to the position of senior and junior creditors in bankruptcy. Assuming that
monitoring is a productive activity they find that neither absolute priority nor a more
debtor friendly rule is efficient with respect to monitoring incentives of all creditors. In
other words, the issue of the ex ante efficient distribution of assets in bankruptcy
remains unresolved even when a rather narrow range of specific assets is considered.
What can be said is that ex ante efficiency is enhanced if:
1.Insolvency procedures are flexible enough to allow different types of resolutions for
firms with different types of stakeholdes.
2. Recontracting is possible for services provided with specific assets.
 3. Insolvency procedures are well-defined ex ante.  In other words, the rules for dealing
with insolvency should not be subject to uncertainty.
4.Insolvency procedures allow speedy resolution of distress.
4. Orientations of Insolvency Procedures
      It is common to denote insolvency procedures as either creditor-oriented or debtor-
oriented. These terms indicate whether the procedures tend to favor creditors or debtors
in terms of claims on the distressed firm’s assets, and in terms of control over these
assets in and after legal proceedings for bankruptcy or restructuring. The existence of an
easily accessible restructuring law generally implies a degree of debtor orientation since
such a law—if it is mandatory-- implies that there is a constraint on the range of
contractual solutions to distress situations. Incumbent owners are permitted to retain a
stake and control after insolvency. Informal work-outs with a lesser stake to be retained
by the incumbent owners are thereby hindered. The degree to which restructuring law12
limits the range of informal contractual solutions depends on the ease of access to the
debtor benefits implied by restructuring.
        The degree of creditor or debtor orientation is not unambiguos as we shall argue
below. A more interesting classification of law from an analytical point of view is the
degree to which it recognizes terms of ex ante contracts in formal bankruptcy and
restructuring proceedings.
     From an economic efficiency point of view we want to evaluate whether procedures
are “survival”-or “shut-down” oriented quite independent of whether control changes
hands or not. Survival of a firm is possible even if liquidation is mandatory under formal
procedures, because an insolvent firm’s assets can be sold as a ”going concern”. The
assets can even be sold back to the original owners. Furthermore, creditors can agree on
a informal work-out prior to bankruptcy with conditions for the owners. Thus, an
evaluation of the survival-orientation of  insolvency procedures requires that incentives
for informal work-outs, and incentives for the sale of assets as a “going concern” are
analyzed. These incentives are naturally strongly influenced by the design of formal
insolvency law, its application and enforcement.
     It would be most interesting to evaluate the orientation of procedures relative to an
efficiency-benchmark but for reasons discussed such a benchmark cannot easily be
determined. The “optimal” orientation in any dimension may vary across industries, and
the nature of shocks causing insolvency.
    We begin by discussing determinants of creditor and debtor orientation, and the
recognition of ex ante contracts in formal law. Laws in different countries are also
compared. Restructuring law and its different elements is the subject of the next section
before presenting evidence on the survival and shut-down orientation of laws in different
countries.
     Table 2, based on Wood (1995), ranks countries insolvency laws in terms of creditor-
debtor orientation. Wood defines a creditor-oriented law as one that recognizes the
claims of creditors to the greatest extent in insolvency. A debtor-oriented law allows
debtors to retain a stake and/or control in insolvency although there is no equity left in
the firm.13
      Table 2 rates traditional British law as the most creditor-oriented, and current French
law as the most debtor-oriented. The implementation of formal procedures for
restructuring (administration) in 1985 and 1986 has made British law less creditor-
oriented but it is still rated as marginally more creditor oriented than German, Dutch and
Swedish law. Japanese and US laws are rated in the middle as more creditor-oriented
than Italian, Spanish, and French law. Most developing countries base their insolvency
laws on the law of the former colonial power, while the former members of the
communist block seem to have adopted an insolvency law akin to one of the Western
European laws.
        The main determinants of the creditor-orientation are listed in Table 3. Increasing
the scope and efficiency of security allows more financing against collateral with greater
probability for the secured creditors to keep the claim intact. On the other hand, the
stronger the position of secured creditors, the less likely it is that unsecured creditors,
employees, and the state will be paid in insolvency.
     The existence of a rehabilitation statute or restructuring law reduces or weakens the
position of creditors, because debtors are able to seek protection against some or all
creditors, and it allows a search for a court-led solution with control and a remaining
stake for the debtor. From creditors’ point of view restructuring law may have the
advantage that debtors have a stronger incentive to maximize the value of the assets
even when distress can be foreseen. These incentives depend on the prospects for an
informal work-out, however. It is possible that under some circumstances a stronger
position of creditors enhances the likelihood of a work-out. We return to this issue
below.
      If the law allows set-offs in insolvency, then some unsecured creditors have a de
facto security in the form of a debt to the insolvent firm.
       Recognition of ownership of assets in the possession of the debtor but not formally
owned by the same is a controversial issue and ambiguous from the point of view of
creditor-orientation. Clearly, if assets in a trust are deemed to belong to the estate of the
insolvent firm it increases the funds available for creditors. On the other hand,
recognition of ownership to assets in a trust can be seen as recognition of ex ante
contractual relations, which is also the principle of recognition of security.14
      Whether the veil of incorporation and therefore limited liability of shareholders, and
protection of directors against personal liability actually protects creditors or not can be
debated depending on circumstances, but upholding the protection offered by the veil in
insolvency can also be seen as recognition of ex ante contractual relations.
   The upshot of this discussion is that increasing creditor orientation as defined above
amounts to the increased recognition of ex ante contractual relations after the filing for
bankruptcy or restructuring.
 Table 3  Determinants of creditor orientation
     Table 4 (from Wood, 1995) lists a number of aspects of the law that influences the
scope and efficiency of security of creditors, and therefore creditor orientation. These
aspects of the law are fairly intuitive in their consequences and will not be discussed in
detail. In the table countries are listed on a scale from very sympathetic to very hostile to
security. Of particular interest here is the protection offered “floating charges”, i.e.
security against all potential cash flows, and the position of employees and the state.
Floating charges can be viewed as extending the scope of assets that can be offered as
security to intangibles. Countries listed as very sympathetic to security allow floating
charges as security. Countries listed as sympathetic rank employees and the state below
all senior creditors, while at least some senior creditors are ranked below employees and
the state in “hostile” countries
5.
Table 4.  Influences on creditor orientation of security
     The different factors contributing to the creditor-orientation of insolvency law are
compared across some countries in Table 5. A low score for a particular factor implies
high creditor orientation and recognition of a particular group of ex ante contracts. The
maximum score is 10 for those factors contributing relatively much to the weakening of
creditors’ position. The maximum score is 5 for other factors. There are two factors
listed in Table 5 which were nor shown in Table 3. These factors are “Preferences”, and
                                               
5 In some “sympathetiic” countries employees are protected by other means. For example, in Sweden there
is a state supported wage guarantee for employees of bankrupt firms.15
“Recission”. A low score on Preferences implies that assets that have been diverted from
the firm by the debtor prior to insolvency, can be taken back to the insolvent estate by
the court, if the diversion had the purpose of reducing assets available to creditors.
Recission means that contracts with, for example, suppliers of inputs and services which
have been entered before bankruptcy are void when bankruptcy proceedings begin. In
other words, a supplier need not deliver according to contract unless the insolvent firm
also delivers. Recission is in principle similar to set-off. Thus a low score implies that
the obligations of the suppliers are cancelled, protecting them from the breach of
contract implied by insolvency. A high score implies that the assets of the insolvent
estate are maximized for the benefit of the debtor and some creditors.
     It can be seen in Table 5 that countries are ranked differently in different important
dimensions. While the traditional English procedures and the French procedures are on
either extreme in all dimensions, the German system is actually more creditor oriented
than the English in two dimensions. In particular, the prospects for formal rehabilitation
in favor of the debtor are low in Germany, while the implementation of restructuring law
in England in 1986 has made the system more debtor-friendly in this respect. Both
German and Japanese laws protect title finance strongly but contracts are not recognized
as strongly “across the board” as in British law. For example, set-offs and trusts are
recognized in British law. The scope of security is also wider in British law with the
strong recognition of floating charges. These differences affect incentives of different
creditors in informal work-outs. We return to this issue in Section 6.
   The US legal system is very debtor friendly in terms of prospects for rehabilitation
under Ch.11, but relatively creditor friendly in other dimensions, and, therefore, in
bankruptcy.
Table 5 Sources of creditor/debtor orientation in selected countries
        Since one objective of insolvency law is to keep viable entities alive the role of
formal rehabilitation proceedings is particularly interesting. Elements of restructuting
law are discussed next.16
5. Restructuring and Survival
In Table 5 it was shown that the existence and design of restructuring law is an
important determinant of creditor orientation of insolvency law.   The different
scores in the Table reflect a number of factors that influence the probability that a
debtor retains a stake in, and control over a rehabilitated firm. These different factors
are listed in Table 6.  The factors printed in bold face are considered particularly
important for the prospects of the debtor in insolvency, and for the incentives to use
restructuring law.  A “mild” restructuring law implies that entering proceedings
under the law leads to a protective freeze on creditors’ actions but not to any
fundamental  distortion of creditors’ rights. A “tough” restructuring law in the
Tables means that entering proceedings leads to significant erosion of creditor rights
with preservation of the debtor’s estate and the debtor’s possibility of survival in
control.
    Most countries—even those with strongly creditor-oriented laws --allow for so
called compositions implying a moratorium on the payment of debts and the
possibilities for a negotiated restructuring of creditors’claims. These composition
procedures are very rarely used because of requirements for immediate payments of
a share of non-secured creditors’ claims (Austria, Brazil, Denmark, Italy, Norway,
Sweden and others), or because the debtor must show that insolvency resulted from
misfortune rather than mismanagement (Belgium, Luxembourg).
       More debtor-friendly restructuring law has been implemented in recent
decades in a number of countries. The French law of 1967 changed the orientation of
French law strongly. Chapter 11 of the US bankruptcy code was enacted in 1978.
British “administration proceedings” have been possible since 1986. Australia
allowed formal restructuring in 1992, while Germany and Sweden have enacted
restructuring laws in 1994 and 1996 but the latter two laws are not much different
from already existing composition laws.
       Among the countries in Tables 5 and 6, the UK, Germany and Japan have
“weak” laws. Traditional French “weak” law still “lives” in many former French
colonies.  A weak law in the sense described has the consequence that the incentives
for a debtor to seek protection under the law are relatively weak.  It can also be seen17
in Table 6 that entry into restructuring proceedings is “not easy” in the same
countries. In fact the number of restructuring cases in these countries is very small
(in the order of magnitude of a few to10 percent of the number of bankruptcy cases.
One important reason for the small number of cases is that the laws specify that
assets be large enough to pay unsecured creditors a certain fraction of their claims.
Once insolvency occurs it is rare that there are sufficient assets for this purpose after
secured creditors have been paid. Incentives to enter restructuring are also weakened
if contractual obligations are not abrogated as in bankruptcy.
Modern French law (redressement judiciaire and reglement amiable), American
law (Chapter 11), Spanish law and Italian law (see Table 5) are “strong.”  Table 6
shows that inboth France and the U.S, it is “easy” for a debtor to seek protection
against creditors. The courts will accept a debtor’s application if there is some
likelihood that the firm is a viable entity.  In Spain, on the other hand, entry is not
considered “easy” although the debtor’s position is strong once restructuring
proceedings have begun.
         The laws differ in terms of their protection of various claims on the debtor.
In particular, secured creditors are protected in countries with “weak” laws but not in
countries with “strong” laws.  These differences reflect the objectives of the law.
While British law is oriented towards upholding contracts, French law in particular
explicitly gives the courts the role of keeping firms in operation, and preserving
employment..
     The control over the firm in restructuring shifts to the courts or to a person
assigned by the court to different degrees.  In countries with mild restructuring laws,
management certainly loses control.  Under Ch. 11 in the U.S., the management
retains control, under court supervision.  In other countries with “strong” laws, the
influence of management is up to the courts and depends on the court’s objectives.
In France in particular the courts’ powers are used to protect employees and the role
of the old management is subordinated to this objective.
     The differences among restructuring laws reflect not only their objectives but,
most likely, the different organizations of financial systems and the rules for
banking.  Kaiser (1994) observes that American banks are reluctant to get much18
involved in corporate decisions, because they may be held liable for bad advice
(lender’s liability). There are many alternative sources of financing in the American
marketplace in particular, with the result that a corporation’s financial structure  is
often complex with a large number of creditor groups with conflicting interests.  A
negotiated informal work-out involving debt-rescheduling or reduction can therefore
be difficult to achieve (Baird 1997 a and b). There is always a risk that one creditor
demands full, immediate repayment, thus preventing a negotiated settlement.
Accordingly, the courts are able to bind dissenters in Ch. 11 proceedings.
     German and Japanese financial markets are bank-oriented, and banks are deeply
involved in corporate decision making.  One bank tends to serve as the “house-bank”
and main senior creditor of each corporation.  The house-bank is well-informed about
the economic situation of the firm, and it can initiate informal work-out negotiations.
Therefore the banks determine the treatment of insolvent firms in the vast majority of
insolvencies. Also in the UK banks tend to lead informal work-outs although the
position of banks in corporate control is weaker than on the continent (see Franks and
Sussman, 2000). British banks do not risk liability as American banks do, however.
     Rehabilitation proceedings or restructurings have a low success rate in most
countries, including France and the U.S. where the proceedings are relatively accessible.
Kaiser (1994) presents date for the U.S.A., Germany, France and the U.K. The data for
insolvency cases in the U.K. show  that around 11,000 cases in 1993 went directly to
bankruptcy proceedings, while nearly 3,000 went into restructuring of which around two
thirds ended up  in liquidation.
     In Germany prior to 1994, composition proceedings were extremely rare.  For all
practical purposes, firms went bankrupt and were liquidated, or banks organized work-
outs.  The situation is the same in most countries with conventional composition as the
only formal restructuring procedure.  The laws in Germany were amended in 1994 to
include a limited stay on enforcement of security but these changes have made little
difference.  The experiences are similar in Sweden where composition was changed into
a “weak” restructuring law in 1996.
     In the U.S. the number of cases confirmed for reorganization under Ch. 11 seems
to be on the order of magnitude of 10 percent of firms liquidated or applying for19
reorganization (Wood, 1995).  Nearly 20 percent of hose filing for Ch. 11 are confirmed
for reorganization (Kaiser, 1994).  The time between filing and confirmation is counted
in years.  Thus, the share of insolvency cases that end up in reasonably speedy
liquidation is much lower than in Germany and the U.K.
     For France Kaiser reports a success rate of about 15 percent of firms entering
some kind of restructuring proceedings.  The number of such firms seems to be about
twice the number in the U.K.  If we classify the countries as relatively liquidation- vs.
restructuring-oriented based on these observations, Germany is clearly the most
liquidation-oriented country followed by the UK.
     In both the U.S. and France most firms filing for Ch. 11 or applying for
restructuring end up being liquidated but the time it takes to get there is longer.  The
experience in France is that many of the firms being restructured  -- often for reasons of
preserving employment – return to insolvency after some time.  In the U.S., the firms
exiting from Ch. 11 seem to survive more often. However, Ch. 11 allows many insolvent
firms to live for a year or two, only to end up being liquidated.
        In order to evaluate whether restructuring law actually contributes to the
survival of viable entities, or only allows economically distressed firms an extended life
under legal protection, we have to compare effects of restructuring law with incentives
of creditors to contribute to informal work-outs with or without the incumbent
management.
6. Stylized facts about insolvency regimes.
             To what extent are financially distressed firms rehabilitated in informal
work-outs, and to what extent are economically distressed firms allowed to survive
under different insolvency regimes? In this section we look at the empirical evidence
that may have a bearing on the efficiency of different insolvency law regimes. Both
industrialized and emerging market countries are discussed.
Thorburn (2000) analyzes the results of 300 liquidation cases in Sweden between
1987 and 1991. She finds that in 75 percent of the cases the bankrupt firms survived as
“going concerns”.  Sweden has a strongly creditor oriented law and allows floating
charges like the UK. Restructuring law was and remains inaccessible. On the other hand20
the incidence of bankruptcy is very high in an international comparison. The procedure
employed by the courts in bankruptcy is “cash auction” of the firms, meaning that the
courts take over the insolvent firm and try to sell the whole entity to the highest bidder.
The liquidation of the whole entity is often “pre-packaged” by a lead-bank that has
found and organized the financing for a buyer of the firm.  It happens also that the buyer
is the old owner who obtains a loan from the bank to buy the firm after liquidation. In
the latter case, the bank as the secured creditor has organized a bankruptcy, leaving the
firm intact and without liabilities to the unsecured creditors.
     Stromberg (2000) argues that the Swedish cash auction system leads to a sale of
assets back to the original owner when the bank benefits from this solution, and that the
probability of such a sale-back increases with the specificity of the firm’s assets.  Thus,
it seems that the auction system, to a large extent, accomplishes what restructuring laws
are designed to accomplish.
     The high survival rate of the liquidated entities in these cases seems quite
surprising taking into consideration that the data do not cover informal work-outs. No
doubt the role of the bank in pre-packaging deals before auctions is crucial in explaining
the survival rate.  The figures indicate that criticism of highly creditor-oriented
insolvency procedures on the grounds that they cause too many shut-downs of firms can
be questioned.
Franks and Sussman (2000) present complementary evidence for Britain. They show
in a study of three banks’ handling of distressed firms that the banks have implemented
elaborate informal rescue processes. The majority of distressed firms remain outside
formal procedures, and the rate of liquidation does not seem particularly high, when
banks remain in control of the insolvency procedure.
        Wood (1995) notes that a common observation of bankruptcy lawyers is that the
greatest disincentive for informal work-outs of distress situations is the existence of
relatively debtor friendly restructuring law.  The evidence for Sweden and the UK seem
to confirm this observation. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the existence of
strong restructuring law (France, U.S.) allows a greater survival rate for financially
distressed but viable firms as compared to countries with no or ineffective restructuring21
laws (U.K., Germany, Sweden). The caveat to be noted here is that the evidence
presented refers to periods with normal economic conditions.
       The high survival rate of firms in the Swedish court auction system has been thrown
into doubt after the banking crisis of 1991-1993. Most of the data in the cited studies
refer to the period before the crisis. There has been much criticism of the Swedish
banks’ eagerness to liquidate relatively small firms during the crisis. It seems that they
(with one exception) abandoned their role as house-banks providing liquidity in hard
times, and liquidated many small but viable firms in which owners could not offer
additional collateral when asset prices and the value of collateral fell.
6 The result of the
liquidations--once asset prices recovered--was a gigantic transfer of wealth to banks and
other firms which obtained the collateral assets of the liquidated firms, as well as a
seemingly high rate of shut-downs of viable relatively small entities.
7
       The conclusion that may be drawn from the evidence presented is that the absence
of restructuring law has not hindered the survival of viable firms in financial distress
during normal times, and probably speeded up the shut-down of economically distressed
firms. During periods of severe macroeconomic crisis the Swedish informal system for
restructuring did not function well, however, because the willingness of banks to supply
credit for survival was reduced, and there were few potential buyers with the means to
buy distressed firms as “going concern”
An important question is whether a system with easier access to formal restructuring
could function better during macroeconomic crisis. Formal reorganization procedures
may have the advantage of providing more time for alternative bidders to appear. The
cost would be that the life of economically distressed firms may be prolonged as well. It
is possible that the only effective remedy is to resolve a threatening banking crisis
quickly.
8
                                               
6There is no hard evidence supporting these statements but there are a very large number of court cases
wherein banks have been sued with little success for breach of credit promises. The discussion draws on
ongoing research by Ph.D. students in the department of economics, Gothenburg.
7 The banking crisis in Sweden occurred during a very severe recession with substantial asset deflation. It
also happened at a time when stricter capital requirements were imposed on the banks, weakening their
incentives to supply liquidity.
8 The role capital requirements play in supplying liquidity in a macroeconomic crisis is another factor
deserving research.22
The evidence presented so far refers to Europe and the USA. We turn now to Asia
and emerging market economies where explicit insolvency law plays a lesser role.
Insolvencyasia (1999) reports that prior to the Asian crisis in 1997 bankruptcies were
almost non-existent in Indonesia, Korea, Thailand, Taiwan and the Philippines. Only
Malaysia, Singapore and Japan among the East Asian economies had and have
insolvency law that is actually applied with frequency. The data presented in the
Appendix indicates that insolvency procedures in the last three countries were in
accordance with law, while in the former five countries procedures tended to be more
debtor oriented than the law.
There are three possible reasons why the actual insolvency system looks very
different from the system described in formal law. First, the credit allocation process of
banks may be influenced by political factors and specific groups with strong relations to
a bank. Second, the legal process for dealing with insolvency according to the law is
ineffective, time consuming, or corrupt. Third, creditors and debtors prefer informal
procedures, perhaps because their value system differs from the one expressed in law.
Among the East Asian countries, Korea, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines had
banking systems that did not impose a hard budget constraint on firms and political
influences on credit allocation were strong as shown in Hussain and Wihlborg (1999).
No doubt, many firms in economic distress were able to survive and accumulate over
time in these countries, contributing to the crisis when the costs of the procedures
became too high.  As shown in the Appendix the judicial procedures were ineffective or
unpredictable in terms of judicial handling in these four countries, as well as in Taiwan
(China). Insolvency procedures thereby became de facto relatively debtor oriented. In
Hong Kong (China) informal procedures seem to be have been preferred in spite of the
existence of an effective legal system. Also Taiwan (China) seems to have had effective
informal procedures although the legal system was unpredictable. In contrast to the other
countries with ineffective legal procedures banks in Taiwan (China) imposed hard
budget constraints on firms avoiding the accumulation of economically distressed firms.
Malaysia is the anomaly here, because the country was hard hit by the crises in spite of
effective formal procedures for dealing with firms in economic distress, and a23
reasonably sound credit allocation process. These procedures have contributed to a
relatively fast recovery from the crisis in Malaysia, however..
Indonesia and Thailand have implemented new procedures for restructuring after the
crisis. Data from Insolvencyasia (1999) presented in the Appendix indicate that these
new administrative procedures have not been effective in helping firms restructure, and
to close down non-viable firms. Information obtained in conversations with observers in
Indonesia indicate that there is a deep-rooted attitude that creditors should not obtain
control over assets of firms that owner-managers have built up over many years. This
attitude has contributed to the difficulty of resolving claims even when judges leading
proceedings have been known to be uncorruptable.
In Korea restructuring has been speeded up in formal and informal procedures
encouraged by the government. Korea, along with Malaysia, is a country that has
recovered from the crisis fast according to Husssain and Wihlborg (1999).
    The data in the Appendix indicates that Japan has relatively creditor-oriented and
effective procedures for insolvency. The incidence of bankruptcies is high while formal
restructuring procedures are inaccessible much like Sweden discussed above. The recent
and ongoing banking crisis in Japan indicates that banks have been too generous in
providing credits to related firms, and there is a reluctance to cut off credits even when
firms are in economic distress. The legal infrastructure for handling bankruptcies and
restructuring or workouts certainly exists, if only banks have incentives to try to recover
their claims.
Indian insolvency procedures are also rated and discussed in the Appendix. In spite
of its British inspired creditor oriented law the debt recovery and restructuring systems
are extremely ineffective. Large firms in distress enter administrative restructuring
proceedings that effectively protect debtors for years. Small firms are subject to legal
proceedings but these are very time-consuming. There is also a draconian law
threatening debtors with imprisonment for certain arrears of payment. The incidence of
bank-led informal work-outs of viable firms is low.
Insolvency procedures in Latin America are discussed in Rowat and Astigarraga
(1999). They describe the insolvency procedures as  “woefully inadequate” in most
countries of the region, because they are rigid and formalistic, they give judges too much24
arbitrary power to serve what they consider the “general interest, there is widespread
cynicism about political influences overriding judgements, there is a powerful bias in
favor of labor claimants, and corruption is rampant. Although the procedures are
seemingly debtor oriented they do not provide debtors with effective means to preserve
going concern-value. Nevertheless, any reform that is considered simply pro-creditor is
likely to receive strong resistance according to the writers.
In a senior policy seminar organized by the African Development Bank (1997) legal
institutions in most of Africa are described as inappropriate and lacking qualified
personnel. The credit allocation process is strongly influenced by political factors and
“relations”. As a result, there is a large overhang of non-performing loans in most
countries and there is no effective legal system for recovery of loans and security.
Isaksson and Wihlborg (1995) note in a study of Kenya that local Land Control Boards
can intervene in court proceedings and prevent collateral from being recovered. Political
intervention in court proceedings and the overruling of court decisions are common in
many African countries. Proceedings may take several years to complete and in the
meantime creditors cannot take possession of collateral assets. As a result, banks in
Kenya require collateral valued at several times times the value of loans extended. Biggs
and Srivastava (1996) provide similar information for Ghana, Cameroon, and.
Zimbabwe.
Turning to the former socialist countries in Eastern Europe many have implemented
modern insolvency law but few have managed to enforce the laws successfully. Poland
and Estonia are the countries that have progressed the most in terms developing a
functioning insolvency system based on law.
9  However, lack of capacity in the legal
system is a problem in all the countries. Lack of expertise and tradition affect the time of
proceedings take, as well as the ability of creditors to, for example, recover assets for the
insolvent estate. Uncertain and ill-defined property rights have naturally been a
hindrance for collateralized lending in Eastern Europe.
                                               
9 See, for example, Coates and Mirsky (1995), Gray (1996) and (1997), and Montes-Negret and Papi
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 Hungary experimented for 18 months in in 1992-93 with an extremely strict law
mandating an automatic trigger.
10 Any liability passed due for more than 90 days would
trigger legal action under the insolvency law. If managers did not report to the courts
they faced prosecution. The Hungarian courts with limited capacity got swamped and
economic activity was seriously disrupted. After the automatic trigger was abolished, the
insolvency procedures have evolved and firms may enter either liquidation or
reorganization proceedings with relative ease. The latter procedures have been used to a
decreasing extent by the private sector, and liquidation proceedings have become more
successful in keeping going concern values.
In contrast to Poland the Czech Republic has not addressed the debt overhang
problem of the banks seriously. Access to insolvency procedures is costly because of
long delays, and vague rules with respect to “asset stripping”. The law, like Poland’s,
have many similarities with German law but its application in the Czech republic is less
successful.
Djankov (1998) reports about Romania that “isolation programs” for large loss-
making state enterprises have been implemented but the soft budget constraint imposed
by banks have undermined these administrative restructuring procedures. Banking
reform has not progressed far. Djankov questions the effectiveness of administrative
restructuring procedures outside the court system on the grounds that such systems are
more vulnerable to interferences by special interest groups.
Evidence for Russia is presented in the Appendix. The picture provided there in a
few case-studies is consistent with the picture given by, for example, Gaddy and Ickes
(1999a and b) and Freinkman and Starodubrovskaya (1995). There is a modern
insolvency law but the procedures seem to be used for asset diversion of enormous
magnitudes through the activities of an “arbitrtion managers” appointed by a court to
lead the insolvent entity after bankruptcy filing. Large resources of industrial groups are
spent on influencing the choice of arbitration manager. It cannot be ruled out that the
asset diversion leads to an efficient allocation of assets at the time of bankruptcy, but ex
ante it can be expected to reduce the supply of external financing to enterprises. There
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are also disincentives to file for bankruptcy. In particular, firms “social assets” used to
provide social services to employees and the community are not easily liquidated.
7. Enforcement
       Without court enforcement of insolvency law, the actual rights of creditors at the
time of a borrower’s insolvency are uncertain and the stake-holders that are able to apply
”power” of some kind will be the ones that have the likelihood to claim the assets of an
insolvent firm.  If the ”power” of the debtor in political or physical terms is substantial,
then even a strictly creditor-oriented insolvency law on paper becomes de facto debtor
oriented.
 The evidence provided in the previous section show that lack of enforcement may
be caused by bank behavior and/or the quality of the legal system.  As noted, banks in
many countries do not apply a hard budget constraint because they are guaranteed or
protected by the state, and the credit allocation process is strongly influenced by vested
interests through political influences, or “related” corporations.  The overview of
banking crises in Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) clearly demonstrates that soft budget
constraints are widespread.  In Eastern Europe the formerly state owned enterprises are
still being supplied with credits to protect employment and managerial interests.  In most
African countries, many Latin American countries and several Asian countries, the
political influences on the banking system has led to credit being supplied to de-facto
insolvent firms or firms with no commercial prospects.
The causes of lacking enforcement by the legal system may be low capacity of the
legal system, lack of expertise and tradition, uncertain or ill-defined property rights,
asset diversion/stripping by borrowers, arbitrary powers of courts, and corruption. These
factors may also contribute to a soft budget constraint imposed by banks, because if a
bank faces little likelihood of being repaid it may extend existing credit-lines in the hope
of a turn-around of a borrower or of future state support.
Lack of capacity of the legal system has been a factor in the former socialist
economies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.  Long delays after filing of
bankruptcy before collateral can be repossessed, and before creditors in general can be27
paid work to the detriment of creditors. Assets of the firm can be stripped during the
delay. Weak property registration, accounting, and reporting standards contribute to the
ability of debtors to divert assets from an insolvent estate.
 Corruption is a widespread problem favoring debtors and particular creditors.
Naturally, the prospect of political intervention breeds corruption as does the great
arbitrary powers of judges reported for Latin American countries above..
La Porta et al (1997 a and b) analyze the relationship between the supply of external
finance and indicators of the efficiency of the judicial system, and corruption. They
show that these factors are important for variation across countries in the supply of
external financing. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) show that interest spreads on
corporate debt issued by firms in different countries are influenced by an index of
contract enforcement.
 8..Issues of design of insolvency law as a contract
           Insolvency law is a relatively complex body of law.  There are many
dimensions to the formal law as shown in the Tables in Section 3.  We cannot discuss all
these dimensions here but focus on a few major issues that are important for the
efficiency of formal and informal insolvency procedures. The issues are not entirely
separable but they serve to structure the discussion.
 (i) Is insolvency law necessary and if so must it be mandatory?
 (ii) Which contractual obligations of the distressed firm should be recognized in
insolvency?
(iii)  What priority shall be given to liabilities to employees, tax authorities, and  to
other social objectives?
(iv)  Is there a need for a formal process for restructuring? If so, should access be
restrictive, and incentives to use the process weak or strong?
(v) What degree of veto power should be given to creditor groups in restructuring?
(vi) How will legislation deal with foreign claims on the firm and by the firm?
(vii) How can enforcement of the law be assured?
(viii) Do market oriented solutions provide an alternative?28
(i) Is insolvency law necessary and, if so, must it be mandatory?
Before discussing the specifics of insolvency law,  we discuss the role of contract law in
a market economy and the distinction between enabling and mandatory law.
11 A
fundamental principle of a market economy is that contracts voluntarily entered into
should be respected.  Insolvency law can be viewed as a “standard-form contract” that
ex ante determines how involuntary breach of certain contractual obligations shall be
dealt with.. Clearly, the procedures for dealing with such a failure can be regulated in ex
ante contracts between the firm and various stakeholders.   The complexity of financial
obligations is so high, however, that transactions costs (negotiation, information and
enforcement costs) could be very high if there were no standard form contract provided
by the legislature in the form of insolvency law..
         In the following, it will be assumed for the most part that the objective of the law
is to provide a standard form contract, which represents the contracts the firm and
creditors would want to enter into, if transactions costs had not hindered a voluntary
solution.  The standard form contract may have other objectives as well, however. These
objectives may be to provide job-security, to maximize the tax authorities’ share in the
insolvent estate, or to satisfy some other social objective that is not supplied in the
market place..
       To go one step further it is useful to distinguish between “enabling” and
“mandatory” contract law.
         Enabling law is either a standard-form contract that can be amended and changed
as desired in mutual agreement by the contracting parties, or there is no explicit law but
only recognition and enforcement of voluntarily entered contracts. For example,
enabling standard form corporate charters permit shareholders to change their rules of
governance to adapt to changing circumstances. The purpose of having a pre-specified,
enabling standard form contract is that the standard form provides information about
what aspects of a contract parties need to think of, and it provides a “default contract”
for those who do not want to enter negotiations on many details. Mandatory law not
only pre-specifies a standard form contract but it provides the only legal contract. Parties
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cannot deviate from the standard form even if they would be in agreement.   Wihlborg
(2000) argues that mandatory law tends be less efficient than enabling law, but that
mandatory law is required when the law-maker intends to achieve objectives other than
economic efficiency (in a dynamic sense).  Job security and maximization of tax
revenues are such objectives.
The main argument in favor of enabling law is that it provides flexibility of
contractual terms.  These terms can be varied according to the needs and preferences of
individuals and firms. In the case of insolvency law differences in the degree of
specificity of the distressed firms assets and the assets of suppliers and other
stakeholders may cause variation in the contract that a firm’s owners and its
stakeholders would want to agree on.  .
The arguments for mandatory law and against enabling law have primarily
been made by legal scholars such as Eisenberg (1989), McCheney (1989), Gordon
(1989), and Romano (1989).  Their arguments are primarily based on agency costs when
information is highly asymmetric among, for example, different types of investors and
entrepreneurs.  Macey (1992) refutes these arguments. In particular he argues that if
different contractual terms are reflected in market prices, then there are incentives for
parties to transactions to find the most efficient contract.  For example, procedures and
rights of creditors in insolvency law will be reflected in interest rates for different types
of creditors. Thus, among a variety of priority rules and conditions for debt
restructuring, relative interest rates on different types of debt would vary.  Among
competing procedures the wealth-maximizing one would be chosen in the market.
     Insolvency law is, as noted, very complex for a firm with many stakeholders.  A
standard-form contract is therefore certainly cost-reducing.  Without it, a creditor needs
to include conditions about future credit contracts with competing claims, or contracts
must be renegotiated each time new creditors appear.
          Another and perhaps stronger argument for legislators to favor mandatory
insolvency law is that there are generally social objectives other than economic
efficiency in the minds of legislators. The interests of the state and employees in
particular are often given special weight, and these interests may not be served if
insolvency law is made enabling in every respect.30
     Even if insolvency law is made mandatory with respect to particular social
objectives, it can be designed in such a way that it provides strong incentives for, and
enables efficient work-outs outside court.  In particular, the degree of creditor- and
debtor orientation or more appropriately, the degree to which ex ante contracts are
recognized in insolvency, affects the incentives for informal work-outs as noted in
Section 5. If debtors are given a strong position and contracts cancelled, debtors have an
incentive to delay resolution of insolvency.  During a delay, they will not have to repay,
assets can be diverted in their favor, or they may hope for a turn-around of fortunes.  On
the other hand, if creditors are given strong rights, and their claims are largely preserved,
they have an incentive to resolve the insolvency in a way that maximizes the value of the
estate and their claims. Thus, if they can contribute to a solution with the firm
continuing as a “going concern” they would do so, if such a solution increases the
expected value of their claims.  If the current management is the best suited to continue
in control, then the creditors would want to contribute to a solution that allows such a
resolution.  Evidence was presented in Section 5, that senior creditors in Sweden and the
UK generally contribute to the preservation of going concern values.
        To summarize, insolvency law is likely to reduce transactions costs for many types
of contracts. The law could be made enabling if the legislator has no other objective than
to help the firm and its stakeholders to reach value-maximizing contract, but it must be
made mandatory to some extent, if the legislator has other “social objectives” as is often
the case. These arguments rest on important assumptions about information availability,
and the banking system. These assumptions will be discussed in the following.
(ii) Which contractual obligations of the distressed firm should be recognized in
insolvency?
    The conventional argument is that security should be respected, because voluntary
contractual arrangements would certainly lead to the existence of both secured and non-
secured creditors.  If the financial structure were created at one time all creditors would
know their relative positions and interest rates would adjust to reflect the relative role of
various claims.
          Bebchuk and Fried (1997) have, in a controversial article, questioned the above31
argument, because in practice it violates the principle that a borrower may not
subordinate one creditor’s claim to that of another without the consent of the
subordinated creditor.  A firm with existing debt can enter a loan contract with a new
lender and offer assets as collateral.  In this case, the subordinated debt becomes more
risky but the interest rate on this debt may not be increased.  In principle, the
subordinated debt holder could protect a claim in a contract, but many stakeholders in
the firm do not have the information to protect themselves and negotiations would
become complex.  On these grounds Bebchuk and Fried argue that a case can be made
that secured debt should be repaid less than 100 percent in insolvency.
     Germany has recently adopted fees for secured debt holders that effectively reduce
their claims to 90 percent of the secured amount.  In Sweden, a proposal has been made
that secured debt holders should be given only 50 percent of the value of the secured
debt in insolvency.
     An additional argument in favor of a reduction of the claims of secured debt holders
is that the incentives of senior debt holders to monitor the firm would increase. Further
research on the appropriate reduction of secured claims is desirable. Certainly there is
not one figure for all circumstances. Maybe each firm could make its own determination
of the appropriate figure ex ante based on the trade-off between increased costs of
secured debt, and reduced costs of non-secured liabilities.
 Other important aspects of the recognition of ex ante contracts are set-offs, and  title
financing. These aspects refer to other firms’ financial claims and assets in possession of
the distressed firm. Suppliers, for example, may increase their willingness to provide
trade credits, if they can claim goods that have been delivered but not paid for. The
importance of these considerations would vary across firms. By allowing set-offs the
law would be made more enabling, because suppliers would be able to opt out of set-
offs, if they were given a better price.
(iii) What priority shall be given to liabilities to employees, tax authorities, and  to other
social objectives?
         We have noted that some countries have designed insolvency procedures
specifically to protect employment by designing restructuring law that aims at32
preserving employment. Such laws are discussed below.. The priority of wages due,
taxes due, and possible wage guarantees for employees losing their jobs vary as noted in
section 3. The higher priority for these items reduces the value of claims of senior
creditors in most cases. In general firms would not voluntarily enter such contracts
unless the cost of labor thereby would be reduced substantially. Thus the high priority in
insolvency to the state and employees reduces the scope for financing with a variety of
security arrangements.  It is possible that employees can be protected by other types of
legislation than insolvency law with a smaller efficiency loss.
(iv). Is there a need for a formal process for restructuring? If so, should access be
restrictive, and incentives to use the process weak or strong?
       We argued that informal restructuring is likely to occur in a creditor-oriented
insolvency system recognizing ex ante contracts. Thus, there are great advantages to a
creditor-oriented regime with very limited opportunities for restructuring, since formal
laws act as a disincentive for informal solutions. The conditions for successful informal
solutions were not spelled out, however.  First, the informal procedure is likely to work
best if one firm’s insolvency is isolated and not part of an industry-wide or
macroeconomic crisis.  If the crisis is more general, and other firms and banks are
liquidity-constrained, then bidders for a firm as a going concern may be lacking.  Thus, a
restructuring law should be oriented towards more general crisis situations.
     Second, the informal regime may work relatively well when the relation between a
bank as a senior creditor and a firm is strong. In the American financial system such
banks may be lacking because of “lender’s liability”. Floating charges increase banks
incentives to monitor and remain well-informed about a firm relative to a situation when
banks hold real assets as collateral.
     Third, the liability structure if the distressed firm must not be so complex that
negotiation costs among creditors become very high (Baird 1997b).
        This discussion implies that restructuring law should be designed in coordination
with other rules for financial markets in general and banks in particular. Effective
informal arrangements require that banks’ incentives are consistent with the
maximization of the value of assets. If banks, for example, favor liquidity they may
prefer to have a firm liquidated than to have an existing owner manage the firm. On the33
other hand, the banks must not be permissive in their lending allowing insolvent firms to
continue operations.
        The empirical evidence presented above indicated that informal restructuring has
not worked as well under conditions of macroeconomic crisis or severe recession as
during normal times, because the firm and its assets could not be liquidated quickly, and
banks were unwilling to finance the acquisition of assets. These observations lead to the
question whether restructuring law can be designed so that it “kicks in” only when
informal procedures do not seem to work well? It does not seem feasible to design
access-conditions for formal restructuring such that it does not function as a disincentive
for informal procedures in normal times. Thus, this problem may have to be addressed
through policies towards banking and credit markets.
       Another issue with respect to restructuring law is whether government sponsored
administrative restructuring procedures outside the court system is a good substitute for
formal law. Such procedures have become more common in emerging market countries
in particular. The evidence on these “quasi-formal “procedures discussed above is
mixed. The traditions in each country with respect to the propensity for political
influences on the proceedings vary. The same can of course be said about influences on
legal proceedings but courts are more likely to remain reasonably independent of
political pressures.
(v) What degree of veto power should be given to creditor groups in restructuring?
This question refers primarily to restructuring law and the so called hold-out problem in
negotiations among stakeholders in a distressed firm. The likelihood that one or a few
creditors does not accept a settlement increases with the number of creditors and the
complexity of the firm’s liability structure. The American Ch. 11 has a so-called cram-
down clause which implies that a single or a few creditors cannot hinder an settlement
that most creditors find acceptable. In a complex financial system such a clause seems
almost necessary.
 (vi) How will legislation deal with foreign claims on the insolvent firm and by the
insolvent firm?
This question is very complex but increasingly important because of the increasing
number of  insolvencies with international ramifications. There are few international34
treaties regulating conflicts between laws of different countries when insolvency has
international ramifications. There is a Nordic exception. The EU is still trying to adopt a
common code after many years work.
     Without going into detail on this issue it seems that the most important principle is
non-discrimination against foreigners’ claims on an insolvent estate. A foreign bank
lending to a domestic firm must be treated the same way as a domestic bank. A foreign
firm with claims on an insolvent domestic firm must be treated the same way other
domestic firms are. In most countries this principle is upheld but firms from other
counties than the insolvent one may face an information disadvantage with respect to the
insolvent firm, and particularly about the legal traditions and procedures. These are
problems that can only be remedied by learning and by obtaining expertise.
(vii). How can enforcement of law be assured?
Enforcement is perhaps the most intractable problem in the area of insolvency
law. Lack of enforcement is a world-wide problem but it cannot be solved by simply
writing law. Enforcement touches on the very fundamentals of the political and
economic system of each country. Powerful groups in various countries must find it
necessary for their political survival to create an effective legal system, and old networks
of influence must be destroyed.
Some first steps towards enhancement of the efficiency of the legal
insolvency procedures are proposed for Latin America in Rowat and Astugarraga
(1999). These steps have the objectives of increasing transparency, legal competence,
and the capacity of the legal system. Enforcement problems in the area of insolvency
law have also been recognized in recent initiatives from the World Bank, the Asian
Development Bank, and the African Development Bank.
12
Bank behavior is another important factor for the effectiveness of insolvency
law, especially because banks can prolong the life of firms that are de facto in economic
distress. Government policy towards the banks plays an important role in providing
incentives for banks in the credit allocation process. Reform of banking systems and
                                               
12 The main World Bank initiative is called GILD, Global Insolvency Law Database. A database covering
insolvency law across the world is developed and made accessible through the World bank webs-
site.”Best practices” principles for insolvency law are also developed.35
banking supervision is high on the agenda of the International Monetary Fund after the
Asian crisis.
(viii) Do market oriented solutions provide an alternative?
          During recent years interesting proposals have developed to deal with the costs
involved in bargaining solutions to restructuring. Bebchuk (1990) proposed a “market-
based” solution to resolve the valuation problem inherent in restructurings. Stake-
holders are given “reorganization rights” and call options on the value of the firm
providing the right to buy the “reorganization rights”. The strike prices of options given
to different creditors depend on their priority. The underlying principle of the scheme is
that no creditor should be made worse off with the option than with the original claim.
Thus it is consistent with insolvency law specifying priority or ex ante contracted
priority. Further research refining the original proposal has been conducted, for example
by Aghion, Hart, and Moore (1992). Hart et al (1997) and Hansch and Ramachandran
(2000) have developed an alternative but related auction-based procedure.
   The options approach to restructuring has the advantage of reducing the
time spent in bargaining, and it retains the creditors’ stakes in the firm. There are
problems as well as noted in Bebchuck (1998). One issue that has not been addressed is
what the approach requires in terms of expertise and enforcement capacity of the legal
system. Its future depends on its general acceptance, and institutions that are able to
handle it.
Increased development of markets for distressed firm’s debts can enhance the
acceptance of option based schemes. Such markets may also increase the value of
distressed firms by enhancing liquidity of claims, and contribute to the valuation of the
distressed firms’ assets. Like other market oriented reforms the development of markets
in these financial instruments depend on the development of legal institutions supporting
the markets. Securities unlike physical assets can be traded in any country, however.
Large firms in counties with ineffective legal systems could therefore have their
liabilities traded in markets with well-developed institutions.
9. Concluding remarks36
      Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer (200) state that “The effectiveness of legal instituitions has
a much stronger impact on external finance than does the law on the books”. This
statement is supported by the review of insolvency procedures across the world in this
paper. Emerging market economies--with few exceptions—do not support the letter of
the law with effective application and enforcement. Either the banking system allocates
credit such that insolvency procedures are made irrelevant, or the legal system is so
slow, unpredictable or corruptible that written law and its intent lack force.
        We have noted that changes in the legal system and its enforcement mechanisms
take time. Experiences from Indonesia and Latin America indicate that strong
enforcement of existing law lacks support among powerful groups. Effective
enforcement requires public support for the intent of the law, as well as respect for legal
institutions. In some countries like Taiwan (China) and Hong Kong (China) effective
informal procedures seem to have developed without much use of the legal system.
These experiences can probably not be generalized, however. Informal procedures also
depend on the legal procedures as the ultimate threat.
        The economic role of insolvency procedures and the design of effective procedures
have also been discussed. Particularly critical aspects of insolvency law were discussed
in the previous section. They need not be repeated here. One conclusion that we would
like to emphasize, however, is that the tendency to implement more easily accessible
restructuring law may not increase the survival rate of viable but insolvent firms, nor
decrease the rate of survival of firms producing negative value. The potential
contributions of restructuring law should be analyzed in conjunction with an analysis of
how the banking system works in terms of incentives, liquidity supply, and
competitiveness.37
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Appendix. The practical application of insolvency procedures in Asian
Countries and Russia.
1. ASIA
        English common law provided the basis for insolvency laws in India, Pakistan,
Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong Kong (China). Continental civil law inspired legislators
in Japan, Korea, Taiwan (China). American restructuring law became model for later
modifications in Japan and Korea. According to InsolvencyAsia (1999) the law in
Thailand was inspired by British law. In Indonesia Dutch law had a strong influence,
while law in the Philippines draws on US law. The practical application of the laws in
these countries differ substantially from the application in the countries originally
providing the inspiration for the laws.
       Hussain and Wihlborg (1999) have quantified responses of bankruptcy lawyers to a
questionnaire developed by the Asian Development Bank. The responses have been
made public in Insolvencyasia (1999). The table A.1 shows the quantified responses
according to Hussain and Wihlborg for Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Taiwan (China) and Thailand. Here responses for Japan, Singapore, India, and Hong
Kong (China) have been quantified as well.
      On lines 1-7 the figures refer to cost, efficiency and speed of different debt recovery
processes. The numerical value one is given to a process characterized as low cost, easy,
very efficient and quick while the numerical value three implies that the process is
deemed very expansive, very difficult, inefficient and very slow. Lines 8-10 describe the
time it takes to wind up, reorganize, and work out informally. Lines 11 and 12 tell
whether the incidence of bankruptcy and restructuring is low or high. Informal work-
outs are preferred in some countries either because bankruptcy is the alternative for
debtors and/or that the outcome is expected to be better for creditors. Lines 15-20 finally
quantify the responses with respect to “predictability of a positive outcome” for creditors
in different debt recovery processes, and how “judicial handling” contributes to
predictability. The numerical values on lines 15-20 have the following interpretation:.
The figure one means very high predictability of positive outcome while a five implies
very low predictability for the creditor.42
      In Hussain and Wihlborg (1999) the data in the tables was used to evaluate the
debtor orientation of the procedures as the orientation depends both on the formal laws
and the effectiveness and predictability of procedures. Using the same standard of
ranking here, the ten countries can be classified in groups as follows;
• Extremely debtor friendly:  Indonesia
• Strongly debtor friendly:             The Philippines, India
• Moderately debtor friendly: Taiwan (China), Thailand, Korea
• Moderately creditor-oriented: Hong Kong (China), Japan, Malaysia
• Strongly creditor-oriented: Singapore
      The figures presented in the table can only be taken as indicative. For example, there
may be large variations among countries wherein processes are very slow. Security
enforcement in India is known to take up to ten years, while even three years would be
perceived as very slow. For India large companies in distress are handed outside the
formal insolvency law. India is described in more detail below.
      InsolvencyAsia (1999) reports on the very few cases of formal bankruptcy and
reorganization in Asia with Malaysia, Singapore, and Japan as exceptions. In Hong
Kong (China) there were less than 500 liquidation cases per year and hardly any
reorganization cases in 1997 and 1998. Prior to 1998 there were no cases of liquidation
or reorganization in Indonesia.. Similarly in the Philippines there were no cases of
liquidation for many years. Over 16 years there were 89 “suspension of payments”.
Taiwan (China) reported 2 cases of composition, 8 reorganizations and 47 liquidations
during three years prior to 1998.
Asia after the Crisis.
    The 1997 crisis inspited the adoption of informal restructuring procedures in some
Asian countries like Thailand and Indonesia, where formal law was particularly
ineffectual . In Indonesia 17 cases  liquidation cases were reported in 1998 after
amendments to the law. Informal work-outs are  encouraged. 350 cases came under the
new debt restructuring program. Few have resulted in actual reorganization plans. In
Thailand some 700 firms sought the assistance of the debt-restructuring process. About
half of them resulted in formal agreements. In Korea and Malaysia, restructuring
procedures have been more successful. Government encouragement led to a high43
incidence of restructuring while Malaysia added new procedures to alredy functioning
bankruptcy and restructuring processes.
     Claessens et al (2000) reports figures for the post crisis resolution of bankruptcy
proceedings in three Asian crisis countries; Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. The
three countries were characterized as extremely or very debtor friendly above. To a large
extent they were categorized this way because of the ineffectiveness and unpredictability
of legal processes. Claessens et al reports for Indonesia that out of 52 privately held,
publicly traded firms that filed for bankruptcy in 1997 or 1998 only two were liquidated
three reorganized. 20 cases were dismissed while more than half or 27 remained
unresolved at the end of 1999. The corresponding figures for the Philippines are that out
of a total of 24 filed cases four firms are liquidated, four reorganized, nine unresolved
and seven dismissed. Out of 78 bankruptcy fillings in Thailand, seven were liquidated,
nine reorganized, forty eight  unresolved and fourteen dismissed. These figures indicate
continued low effectiveness of legal procedures after the crisis.
India; Time consuming process es and imprisonment
        In Indian Law a sharp distinction is made between small and large firms. Large
firms that have been in existence for at least five years register with the Board of
Industrial and Financial Reconstruction when they are in distress or “sick” in Indian
terminology. A firm registered with the BIFR is immune from court proceedings
brought by creditors. Instead the BIFR is charged with the responsibility to try to
“nurse” the “sick” firm back to health under the Sick Industrial Company Act. (SICA).
        Small firms in distress are subject to bankruptcy law and various laws for debt
recovery in court proceedings. Court proceedings are generally very time consuming and
enforcement of security may take three to ten years. Thus, the creditors’ formal rights in
the British inspired law are in practice enforced only weakly. In spite of the weak
enforcement debtors are caught in time consuming proceedings without the ability to
operate the firm with reduced debt burdens as long as the claims remain.
      Debtors are even facing the possibility of imprisonment for certain kinds of arrears
in payment. There are a number of laws or statutes on the state level which envisage
recovery at some kinds of outstanding dues as “arrears of land revenue.” Non payment
of land revenue is a criminal offence that leads to penal action and imprisonment for44
periods up to two years.
13 The types of dues that are treated as “arrears on land revenue”
are non-payment of wages due, bonus payments due, employee providence funds due,
sales and excise tax due, payments due to State financial institutions and to electricity
boards.
       From 1986 through June 2000, 3068 large companies were registered under the
SICA. Aggregate losses amounting to USD 11 billion were twice the initial equity. The
firms employed 1.8 million workers. 741 companies were closed down, 626 cases were
dismissed while a rehabilitation scheme was sanctioned for 603 firms. The remaining
firms remain in operation awaiting action. The delay before any action is taken under the
SICA is on the average three to four years. Thus, debtors obtain de facto legal protection
during this period and remain in possession.
       Of the 603 firms that were approved for rehabilitation, 228 were discharged on
revival of the case. Thus, more than one third of the cases were dismissed indicating that




           According to a number of sources the current Russian bankruptcy arrangements
represent a rigid and nontransparent system of redistribution of property. To understand
the failure of "theoretically good" insolvency law one should go beyond general analysis
of the legislation and consider institutional traps of Russian economic reforms and
bankruptcy law in particular.
     The existing bankruptcy scheme in Russia has three main groups of actors:
1. The executors - arbitration managers acting in the interests of some other party.
2. The intermediaries - the arbitration court employees (judges) and the public
organizations (unions) of arbitration managers
3. The ordering party - regional governors wishing to further improve their economic
powers; other companies (most often the creditors of the company) interested in taking
                                               
13 This section draws on presentations by Bibek Debroy, S.D.Nanda and Kishore Soni at Conference on
Bankruptcy and Debt recovery Procedures, Indian Statistical Institute, New Dehli, January 15-16, 200145
control over the company, for the sake of, for example, vertical integration. The ordering
party can be a physical or legal person, which for some reason is interested in the target
company.
     Due to the specific nature of Russian bankruptcies the initiation of bankruptcy and
the replacement of the current management with the interim manager appointed by a
court of law is most often accompanied by scandals and sometimes violent conflicts.
To understand a struggle accompanying the appointment of arbitration managers we
must look closer at the nature of their activities.
       On the surface the scheme of introducing the external administration is rather
simple. The creditor with the face value of claims over 42 thousand rubles (as of 1999)
has a right to file to the court a bankruptcy petition on the debtor, if the latter is 3 months
overdue on his payments.  An arbitration court considers the petition and appoints an
interim manager. The interim manager calls the creditors meeting, which decides on the
candidate to the post of external manager. After the court approves the proposed
candidate, all the management functions of the debtor are transferred to the external
manager who is supposed to come up with the plan of administration, revise the
financial accounting, divest inefficient activities etc.
      At the expiry of the period of external administration there are 3 scenarios for the
company's emergence from bankruptcy:
1. The company becomes a candidate for competitive proceedings (liquidation). The
money is used to pay off the claims of creditors.
2. The creditors reach a "peace agreement". Claims are restructured and the company is
returned to the previous owners.
3. The external administration leads to a full recovery of financial health of the debtor,
and the company emerges from bankruptcy clean of overdue debt.
         In practice, the property of the debtor is transferred to an alternative user long
before the company is up for competitive proceedings. In order to do that a number of
schemes have been developed ranging from a simple expropriation and sale of property
to more complicated schemes involving the creation of subsidiaries.46
         The very possibility of this asset diversion explains the struggle over the
appointment of external manager. The anecdotal evidence about Russian bankruptcies
resembles the plot of the detective stories.
Some Anecdotal Evidence
14
      One of the most prominent stories involves the change of the interim manager on the
Achinsk Alumina Factory (AAF). In the Soviet times this factory was the biggest
producer of alumina. The Krasnoyarsk Aluminum Plant (KAP) was one of the largest
customers. The unsuccessful adjustment of the AAF in the post-reform period led to
formal bankruptcy at the end of the 1996. The external administration was introduced
and Gleb Fetisov, formerly employed in the financial "Alfa-group", was appointed as an
arbitration manager. At that moment in time the interests of "Alfa-group” and KAP
coincided and there was no argument with respect the candidate to this post. During the
next 1,5 years the management of KAP had changed and in the middle of 1998 KAP and
"Alfa" stopped their collaboration.
        In the summer of 1998 five Russian aluminum plants (including KAP) proposed to
appoint a new arbitration manager to AAF. The Arbitration court of Krasnoyarsk region
supported this initiative and Nail Nasirov - the candidate of the aluminum plants - was
appointed as an arbitration manager. This event started the ongoing conflict between the
"Alfa-group" and the aluminum plants, which does not seem to end in the near future.
It should be mentioned that every replacement of the management in this story was
accompanied by a full scale "military operation" involving armed company security
forces and militia. In particular, at one point in time Russian media covered the "Alfa-
group" action of sending a jumbo airplane from Moscow with security-personnel and
transport-vehicles to enforce the takeover of AAF.
          When the new external manager – Nail Nasirov – began his work, he discovered
that AAF owned very few assets. In fact, during the management of the previous
manager – Gleb Fetisov – most of the assets of the company  had been transferred to
“Alfa-group”- affiliated companies. According to Nail Nasirov, when he started his
                                               
14 We are grateful to Eugene and Anton Nivorozhkin Ph.D. students at the Gothenburg University for
gathering this material about Russia.47
work AAF did not any longer own the technological equipment situated at the company
premises.
           The schemes used to transfer the property of AAF were complicated. In the
beginning of 1997 AAF received from Alfa-Bank two loans amounting to 25 billions
rubles (pre-denomination currency). Simultaneously the company signed two guarantee
agreements with “Alfa-Eco”, according to which “Alfa-Eco” would cover the payments
in case of AAF default, but the penalty for AAF would be a 1 percent daily interest rate
on the amount of loan. AAF started to pay penalties already in the spring of 1997. By
February1998, the AAF liability to “Alfa-Eco” exceeded 100 million rubles
(denominated rubles). Gleb Fetisov decided to pay off the liabilities of AAF by
transferring the assets of AAF to “Alfa-Eco”. As a result “Alfa-Eco” received the fixed
assets valued at 75 million rubles, 25 million of finished production, and the rights to 5-
year rent of Kiya-Shaltur mine properties, where the main raw material of AAF—
nepheline—is extracted.
       The legality of the “Alfa-group” actions are challenged in the court with several
criminal charges outstanding before the courts of Krasnoyarsk region.
     A second interesting case is the appointment of arbitration manager to Novosibirsk
Metal Plant - the monopolist in the Russian market of thin-alloyed steel. During 4 weeks
the court could not choose a person to this post from a long list of potential candidates.
In the meantime the local media presented evidence that a number of candidates to the
post of arbitration manager represented different organized crime groups of the region. It
took seven attempts for the court to reach a decision.
          A third case is the Moscow Electromechanical Plant No 1(MEP)--a big supplier of
equipment for the defense industry. The main events in this case are the following:
November 1 1997. The external manager Valadimir Alyabev begins his work at MEP.
He is recommended to this post by the Guild of Anti-crisis Managers headed by
Grigoriy Un. On the same day Alyabev changes the company security personal.
November 3. New security personnel invalidates old entry passes of the plant and blocks
the entry to the company premises.
November 4. The head of  “Luka” Ltd is appointed to be a production chief at MEP. He
orders the substitution of “Luka” Ltd for MEP in all the supply contracts.48
November 6. The equipment is sent from the company warehouse in “an unknown
destination”.
December 11. The head of Guild of Anti-crisis Managers – Grigoriy Un – is meeting the
worker representatives and informs them that the wages will not be paid. Payment is
promised only to those who change their employment from MEP to “Luka” Ltd.
December 12-13. The continuing shipment of equipment and inputs from the
warehouses.
In 18 months a large technologically intensive company was basically liquidated. By
March 25 1998 the production process was stopped.
Results of bankruptcy initiation
      In the period from March 1 to December 25 1998 the arbitration courts of Russian
initiated 4573 bankruptcy cases of manufacturing companies, according to the Head of
the Federal Insolvency Agency (FIA), Georgiy Tal. About one third or1462 companies
were placed under observation, 472 were given external administration, tender was
initiated for 2006 companies, while the creditors and shareholders of 80 companies
reached  “peaceful agreements”. Only 6% of the bankruptcy cases were initiated by the
state compared to 40% in the previous year. The bulk of the cases were initiated by
creditors.
Almost all sectors with the possible exception of gas extraction, are represented in
bankruptcy cases. Not surprisingly, the wave of bankruptcies often follows the
competition in connection with privatization in certain industries with the coal mining
industry as the latest example.
        Bankruptcy-practices can also be categorized by the underlying political and /or
economical “interests”. Analysis is complicated by the hidden nature of these interests
but one can often trace the interests of local administrations, financial-industrial groups,
and the biggest creditors like Gasprom (GAZP) and Unified Energy System of Russia
(RAO UESR).49
Table 1. Types of distress and efficient action at the time of distress (ex
post efficiency)
               Definition                  Action
The net present value of  assets is
negative under any management
team
 Piecemeal liquidation of assets Economic distress
The net present value of assets is
positive under a different
management team
Sale of assets as a “going concern”
to enable a change of management
The present value of cash flows is
positive but it is lower than the
value of claims by non-
shareholders
Debt reduction in combination with
restructuring and/or ownership





Table 2: Creditor/Debtor Orientation of Corporate Insolvency Law
Based on Wood (1995)
Scale: 1= Most pro-creditor
         10= Most pro-debtor
1. Former British colonies except S. Africa and Zimbabwe
2. England, Australia, Ireland
3. Germany, Netherlands, Indonesia, Sweden, Switzerland, Poland
4. Scotland, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway
5. United States, Canada except Quebec
6. Austria, Denmark, Czech and Slovak Republics: S. Africa, Botswana,
Zimbabwe (all three Dutch-based);
7. Italy
8. Greece, Portugal, Spain, most Latin American countries**
9. Former French colonies, Egypt, Belgium and Zaire
10. France
 No insolvency law: Liberia (many Arab countries)
Not classified: Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Khazakstan
*Orientation by explicit law disregarding implementation through the court
system
**Except Paraguay that protects security interests strongly.51
Table 3. Determinants of high degree of credit orientation
Wood (1995)
1. Wide scope and efficiency on bankruptcy of security and title financing
(retention of title, factoring, leasing)
2. Weak corporate rehabilitation statutes
3. Insolvency set-off enables reciprocal unsecured creditor to be paid ahead
of other unsecured creditors
4. *Ownership of assets in the possession of debtor is recognized (e.g. trusts)
5. *veil of incorporation and protection of directors against personal liability
*These determinants are ambiguous from creditors point of view, but creditor-
orientation by these determinants can be seen as the recognition of explicit
and implicit contracts between the firm and various stakeholders. (See text.)52
Table 4: Influences on creditor orientation of security and attitudes to
security in various countries
Following Wood (1995)
1. The scope of assets which may be mortgaged, availability of “floating
charges” (charges over all assets), availability of chattel mortgages (non-
possessory), security over receivables without notification of debtor,
security over future of after-acquired property.
2. The perfection the security (for example, registration requirement).
3. The degree of formalities acting as hindrance
4. Scope of the debt which may be secured
5. Limitations on the creditors
6. Scope and limitations on remedies
7. Existence of freezes on enforcement of security, moratorium on secure
debt, insolvency administration can use secured asset or substitute in
proceedings.
8. Insolvency administrator can raise super-priority moratorium-loans to
finance rehabilitation.
9. The existence of safe harbors in favor of creditor against the security
being avoided as a preference
10. Certainty and predictability of priority against e.g. taxes and employees.
Country attitudes to security:
Very sympathetic         Sympathetic          Hostile           Very hostile
English common-         Germany               Belgium            Austria
law countries                Japan                     Luxembourg     France
Sweden                         Netherlands          Greece               Italy
Finland                         Switzerland           Spain
Norway                        Scotland                 Most Latin America
                                     S. Africa53
Tabel 5. Creditor orientation in selected countries.







Japan US Italy Trad.
French
France
Security (10) 1 2 5 6 2 8 8 8
Title finance
(10)
1 1 1 1 2 5 8 7
Set-off (10) 1 1 2 2 3 2 10 9
Rehabilitation
(10)
1 3 1 3 8 9 2 10
Trust (5) 1 1 4 2 1 5 5 5
Veil (5) 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 5
Preferences (5) 1 1 2 2 5 2 3 3
Rescissions* (5) 1 1 1 1 4 2 2 5
Total 8 12 17 18 27 35 41 52
*Right of suppliers, patent-holders, etc.to cancel contracts with insolvent firms54
Table 6. Characteristics of restructuring law in selected countries
Constructed based primarily on Wood (1995)
UK France Japan USA Germany Spain
Easy entry based on
restrictions on remaining
assets
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liquidation proceedings
yes yes yes yes yes yes
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to deliver to insolvent
firm)
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      strong
• Weak=protective freeze on creditor action but no fundamental distortion of creditor rights.
Strong= significant erosion of creditor rights with preservation of debtor’s estate and possibility of
survival55
Table A 1: Evaluation of debt recovery and insolvency procedures in Asia
Source: Insolvency Asia (1999), Country report
Japan Singapore Indonesia Korea Malaysia
1=low cost, easy, very efficient, quick
3=High cost,difficult, ineff., slow
1. Process for acquiring security
(collateral) over land
1.25 1 2.75 1.25 1.25
2. Process for acquiring security over
other property
1.25 1.25 2.75 1.25 1.25
3. Process for enforcement of security
over land
1.75 1 3 1.25 1.25
4. Process for enforcement of security
over other property
1.25 1.25 2.5 1.25 1.25
5. Process for debt collection 1.75 1.25 2.5 1.25 1.25
6. Process for winding up insolvent
corporation
1.75 1 2.5 1.25 2
7. Process for
reorganization/restructuring
2 1 2.5 1.75 2
8. Time for winding up 1-2months 1-2months 4-6 months 6-12
months
6-12 months
9. Time for formal reorganization 8-12months N/A 12-18
months
2-4 months 8-12 months
10. Time for informal workout 4-8months 2-4months 4-8 months 2-4months 2-4months
11. Incidence of bankruptcy/liquidation very high N/A very low low high
12. Incidence of
reorganization/restructuring
low N/A N/A high high
Workouts preferred because:




















Predictability of positive outcome for creditors:
1 = very high    5 = very low
15. Process for security enforcement;
land
2 1 5 2 2
16. Process for security enforcement;
other than land
3 1 5 4 2
17. Judicial handling of security
enforcement
2 1 2 3 2
18. Judicial handling of debt collection 2 1 5 3 2
19.Judicial handling of
bankruptcy/liquidation
2 1 5 4 2




Thailand India Hong Kong
(China)
1=low cost, easy, very efficient, quick
 3 = high cost, difficult, ineff., slow
1. Process for acquiring security
(collateral) over land
1.5 1.5 1.5 2.0 1.5
2. Process for acquiring security over
other property
1.5 1.5 1.5 1.25 1.5
3. Process for enforcement of security
over land
2 1.75 1.25 2.25* 1.75
4. Process for enforcement of security
over other property
2 1.5 1.75 2.25* 1.5
5. Process for debt collection 3 2 1.5 1.5* 2,0
6. Process for winding up insolvent
corporation
3 2 1.5 2.0 2.25
7. Process for
reorganization/restructuring
2.25 2.25 1.5 2.0 2.5
8. Time for winding up > 6 months > 6 months > 6 months 4-6 months 1-2 months
9. Time for formal reorganization > 18 months 8-12 months > 18 months >1 year years
10. Time for informal workout 12-18 months 12-18months > 18 months 1-2 years N/A
11. Incidence of bankruptcy/liquidation N/A very low low Very low Very low
12. Incidence of
reorganization/restructuring
N/A very low very low
(since 98)
Very low Very low
Workouts preferred because:
13.Bankruptcy procedures are a real
alternative
no no yes Ineffec-tive Strong
disincentives
14. Better outcome than under formal
procedures (for creditors)
no yes no           N/A no
Predictability of positive outcome for creditors:
1 = very high                             5 = very low
15. Process for security enforcement;
land
2 2 2 3 2.5
16. Process for security enforcement;
other than land
2 1 3                 3 2.5
17. Judicial handling of security
enforcement
2 5 1
18. Judicial handling of debt collection 3 1 2 5 2
19.Judicial handling of
bankruptcy/liquidation
4 5 4 5 2
20. Judicial handling of rehabilitation 4 5 5 5  2
*The processes for debt-collection are reportedly very slow. It may take up to 10 years to collect on
secured debt through the courts. See also scores on judicial handling on rows 17-2057